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One of the most important debates of current corporate law practice
and scholarship is about the appropriate role of target management con-
fronted with a takeover bid. The controversy turns on the identification of
a criterion for evaluating takeovers and target management defensive tac-
tics. An influential body of opinion contends that maximization of share-
holder wealth is the appropriate criterion because, first, traditional notions
of fiduciary duty generally require managers to act in the shareholders'
interest, and, second, shareholder wealth maximization is seen as the best
available proxy for social wealth maximization.' On this view, takeovers
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1. Shareholder wealth maximization is not identical to social wealth maximization. First, a take-
over can redistribute wealth in favor of shareholders without increasing the economic output of the
firm. One example is a transaction that increases shareholder wealth solely through downward rene-
gotiation of employee contracts. See Coffee, Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corpo-
rate Web, 85 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 1986). Another example is a leveraged acquisition that
increases shareholder wealth through a transfer from bondholders, rather than through management
efficiencies. Second, a takeover can result in events that may impose externalities. Obvious examples of
such events include the shutdown of an acquired firm's headquarters and the layoff of workers, which
may severely affect surrounding communities. Shareholder wealth may increase through such efficien-
cies, but total social wealth might not also increase.
Nevertheless, shareholder wealth maximization remains a useful proxy for social wealth maximiza-
tion. First, a transaction or set of transactions that does not satisfy the shareholder criterion is highly
unlikely to satisfy the social criterion, so that shareholder criterion wealth maximization becomes a
necessary if not sufficient condition in the general evaluation of takeovers. Second, the shareholder
criterion is subject to comparatively easy quantitative measurement through analysis of stock price
movements. But cf. Gordon & Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly Information, and Securities
Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 761, 775-86, 825-30 (1985) (questioning models that serve as basis for
stock price studies).
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are desirable because they can increase shareholder wealth in two ways:
first, by moving assets to managers who can produce the greatest economic
return from them; and second, by increasing pressure on current manage-
ment to maximize economic return from assets under their stewardship.
From this starting point, management has only two justifiable options
for responding to a takeover bid.2 Some argue that management should
respond passively. Passivity will maximize shareholder wealth by increas-
ing the returns to search for takeover targets, which raises the number of
value-increasing bids.3 Others contend that management may abandon
passivity, but only to the extent necessary to instigate an auction for the
firm. An auction will ensure that the user who most highly values the
target assets will gain control over them (without the transaction costs of
successive sales) while maximizing the payoff to target shareholders.4
Which of these responses would in fact maximize shareholder wealth is a
matter of dispute.
5
Those who favor permitting target management responses that instigate
auctions must face the problem of the divergence of shareholder and target
management interests in a takeover.' A successful auction means that tar-
get managers will possibly lose their jobs and certainly their autonomy. In
adopting tactics that would tend to produce an auction, management may
2. Of course, "target management responses" do not exhaust the available regulatory or corporate
strategies. In particular, much of the legal literature considers ex ante controls on takeovers through
"shark repellent" charter amendments, see, e.g., Carney, Shareholder Coordination Costs, Shark
Repellents, and Takeout Mergers: The Case Against Fiduciary Duties, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J.
341, and division of the tender decision into a decision to merge and a decision to tender, see, e.g.,
Bebchuk, Toward Undistorted Choice and Equal Treatment in Corporate Takeovers, 98 HARV. L.
REv. 1693, 1747-64 (1985). These responses are ex ante in that the rules are in place before any
acquiror makes a bid. Hence they defiiie the conditions under which a takeover may occur.
3. Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a
Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1161 (1981); Schwartz, Search Theory and the Tender Offer Auc-
tion, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORGANIZATION (forthcoming 1986).
4. Moreover, since first bidders generally make a toehold purchase of target stock, they will make
a substantial profit even if they lose the ensuing auction. This provides sufficient incentives for search.
See, e.g., Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1028,
1034-38 (1982); Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers: A Reply and Exten-
sion, 35 STAN. L. REV. 23 (1982); Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case
Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819, 868-75 (1981); Gilson, Seeking
Competitive Bids Versus Pure Passivity in Tender Offer Defense, 35 STAN. L. REV. 51 (1982). But
see Easterbrook & Fisehel, Auctions and Sunk Costs in Tender Offers, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1982);
Schwartz, supra note 3. See generally Coffee, Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: A Criti-
cal Assessment of the Tender Offer's Role in Corporate Governance, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1145,
1175-83, 1280-82 (1984) (summarizing auction arguments and proposals for regulatory reform).
5. The question is to a great extent an empirical one: whether takeovers serve principally as a
means for improving performance by current managers (which favors passivity), or for transferring
assets to the highest valuing user (which favors auction instigation). Similarly, one must estimate the
costs of search relative to the costs of holding an auction. As auction costs rise relative to search costs,
passivity becomes preferable, while if auction costs fall relative to search costs, action grows more
desirable.
6. See Jarrell, The Wealth Effects of Litigation by Targets: Do Interests Diverge in a Merge?, 28
J.L. & ECON. 151 (1985).
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be hoping to thwart the takeover altogether. On the assumption that target
management will act in a self-interested way, how should we distinguish
tactics that will increase shareholder wealth from those that will not?
Two recent papers propose to answer this question for a particular
class of management defensive tactics: target firm buybacks of its own
stock. The papers, Bradley and Rosenzweig, Defensive Stock Repur-
chases, 7 and Macey and McChesney, A Theoretical Analysis of Corporate
Greenmail,8 come to similar conclusions: Even assuming management
self-interest, some but not all target stock buybacks may increase share-
holder wealth because of the resulting auctions. More specifically, Bradley
and Rosenzweig generally endorse target self-tender offers because they
contribute to an auction process, but criticize target open market repur-
chases because they distort shareholder choice. Macey and McChesney
offer a defense of target buybacks of bidders' stock-better known as
greenmail-on a similar ground. Economic models, explicit in Bradley
and Rosenzweig's article and implicit in Macey and McChesney's article,
underlie the conclusions. Each model, however, makes key hidden as-
sumptions. In exploring those assumptions, we conclude that for each arti-
cle, the case for the particular defensive tactic is "not proved." Indeed, our
analysis of each model strongly suggests the opposite: that target stock
buybacks are unlikely to increase shareholder wealth as a general matter
and, on a shareholder wealth criterion, should not be permitted as a de-
fensive tactic.
Our analysis has a methodological component as well. Current scholar-
ship in corporate theory has adopted, at least in part, an economic re-
search strategy. To deepen understanding of a problem, scholars identify a
few factors deemed important and build a simple model of the phenome-
non. Policy conclusions for complex legal problems flow from the analysis
of the simple model. The great advantage of this research strategy is that
it forces scholars to specify assumptions which can then be tested against
data when available and against one's intuitions of the world when data is
unavailable. Specification of assumptions makes it easy to uncover implicit
assumptions which also can be tested. In this spirit we criticize the models
and assumptions used by Bradley and Rosenzweig and by Macey and
McChesney in studying target stock buybacks. Their models have served
extremely useful functions-clarifying assumptions and forcing deeper
analysis-and thus have increased understanding of how to evaluate target
management responses to takeover bids.
7. 99 HARV. L. REv. 1377 (1986).
8. 95 YALE L.J. 13 (1985).
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I. PRELIMINARIES
To clarify the problem under analysis and the terminology used, we
outline the sequence of events that precedes a target stock buyback. At
time 0, shares of the target company sell at some open market price (P0).
At time 1, some bidder (B) purchases some small number of shares (Sgm)
at P0. At time 2, the bidder makes a tender offer at a price Pt,2 for suffi-
cient shares in the target to give it control. Shares must be tendered by
time 4. At time 3, the prevailing market price of target shares rises in
response to the bid, to price Pm,3. We assume that at time 3 management
causes the target to undertake one of three forms of stock buyback:
(1) Open market repurchases in which the target announces a program
to repurchase a specified number of shares on the open market at the
prevailing market price Pm,3" These open market purchases are made on a
first come, first serve basis;
(2) A self-tender offer in which the target announces a "tender offer"
for its own shares; i.e., an offer to purchase a specified number of shares
at an announced price, Pst,3. For present purposes, the most important
respect in which a self-tender offer differs from an open market repur-
chase program is that all shareholders may participate pro-rata in a self-
tender;1
(3) A targeted share repurchase, or "greenmail," in which the target
repurchases the shares held by the acquiror at an above-market price,
Pgm, 3. In the analysis of both open market purchases and self-tenders, we
assume (without loss of generality and following Bradley and Rosen-
zweig) that the bidder owns no shares prior to the actual tender offer (sgm
is 0).
Development of legal policy with respect to target stock buybacks de-
pends on several factors. First, we must articulate the goals that the law
seeks to promote. Second, we must understand the tender offer process.
Under what circumstances and at what price will potential acquirors
make offers? With what form of repurchase, if any, and at what price,
will management respond? And how will target shareholders choose
among competing offers? Third, we must understand how different legal
rules will influence each of these three questions.
9. The post-tender prevailing market price, Pm 3, will depend on the bid. In the cases relevant to
this discussion, the bid takes the form of a front-loaded, two-tiered bid, so that Pr3 will reflect a
weighted average of the front end and back end offer prices. Bradley and Rosenzweig rely on a
particular model of price determination for Pm 3 that we do not dispute here. Bradley & Rosenzweig,
supra note 7, at 1390-93. Macey and McChesney also apparently rely on a version of this model. See
Macey & McChesney, supra note 8, at 20-21.
10. Other points of difference include that the self-tender offer must remain open for a specific
time period, and that shareholders who have tendered their shares have certain withdrawal rights.
Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 7, at 1379-80, 1384-87.
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Two criteria inform the legal approach to target stock buybacks (and to
much of corporate behavior in general). First, the law seeks to maximize
shareholder wealth. To this end, legal rules should promote the transfer of
assets from "inefficient" managers to "efficient" managers and should in-
duce greater efficiency from current managers. By definition, an efficient
manager earns a higher return on each dollar of assets than an inefficient
manager. Consequently, given two firms facing equal non-diversifiable
risk, the share price of an efficiently managed firm will exceed that of an
inefficiently managed one.""
Second, the law seeks "fair" management treatment of shareholders.
"Fair treatment" encourages shareholder investment and comports with
traditional notions of fiduciary duty. In the context of target stock
buybacks, fair treatment most plausibly means that management actions
must not favor wealth acquisition by one group at the expense of an-
other.12 Differential treatment-discrimination-among shareholders cre-
ates the possibility, though not the inevitability, of such favoritism. Green-
mail clearly discriminates among shareholders because management offers
an above market price only to the acquiror. Open market purchases do
not discriminate ex ante but discriminate ex post. At the time of the an-
nouncement, all shareholders have an equal chance of being first in line in
the open market transaction. Not every one, however, can actually be first
in line. Hence, some shareholders will succeed in reselling their shares to
the target, while others will not. By contrast, self-tender offers are non-
discriminatory both ex ante and ex post."8 Each shareholder has an identi-
cal claim on corporate assets. Bradley and Rosenzweig's and Macey and
McChesney's articles present two challenges: (1) Does discrimination re-
distribute wealth among shareholders? (2) Does discrimination increase
aggregate wealth?
I1. See, e.g., Gordon & Kornhauser, supra note 1, at 776-80 (explaining portfolio theory and
asset pricing models).
12. "Fair treatment" may have another sense, however. It may imply merely that all shareholders
are better off after the target's repurchase program than they were prior to the making of the in-
terfirm bid. The value of their shares or the realized value of their transactions after the repurchase
program exceeds the pre-tender open market price Po. Fair treatment in this sense is closely allied to
the shareholder wealth maximization criterion; if no one has been made worse off, then total share-
holder wealth must have increased. Under this criterion, fairness is a Pareto improvement over the
pre-bid state. This second meaning of "fair treatment" is akin to the claim that an unequal gain-
sharing rule in corporate control transactions is in fact "fair." See Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate
Control Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698, 703-04 (1982). We have elsewhere questioned the fairness
of unequal gain sharing. Gordon & Kornhauser, supra note 1, at 830-33. For a discussion of "fair
treatment" as "equal treatment," see Bebchuk, Toward Undistorted Choice and Equal Treatment in
Corporate Takeovers, 98 HARV. L. REv. 1693, 1780-88 (1985).
13. We have assumed that every shareholder will react identically both to the open market repur-
chase program and to the self-tender. Of course, if some shareholder chose not to tender her shares,
she would not receive an equal portion of the corporate assets. Because she chose not to. tender,
however, we would be reluctant to characterize the inequality as deriving from unfair treatment.
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Our analysis of the behavior of potential bidders, management, and
shareholders rests on conventional microeconomic assumptions of ration-
ally self-interested conduct. The potential for inefficient management rests
on an additional assumption of asymmetric information. Current manage-
ment has the most accurate assessment of the value of the firm's assets. To
discover this value or to monitor management conduct is costly. Manage-
ment may convert some of the value of the corporate assets to its own use,
thereby reducing shareholder wealth. 4 Thus as we said above, takeovers
serve two desirable functions: to move assets to the managers who can
derive the greatest return from them, and to increase management incen-
tives to manage the firm in a way that maximizes shareholder wealth. But
takeovers must also serve a subsidiary, albeit necessary, function: to re-
ward those who uncover information showing that particular assets are
not put to the best use.
The behavioral questions raised by target stock buybacks and their le-
gal treatment are complex. Analysts must understand not only manage-
ment's reasons for initiating the buyback and the likely shareholder re-
sponse, but also whether the buyback will defeat the tender offer. Further,
different legal rules may have different effects on the frequency and terms
with which bidders make tender offers.
Both Bradley and Rosenzweig and Macey and McChesney assume that
the bidder makes a two-tier, front-loaded tender offer. They assume so
because theory suggests that such offers place the most pressure on share-
holders to tender. Let us consider this argument now, since it will recur in
our discussion.
The "front end" of a two-tier, front-loaded offer is a high price for
50.0001% of the target's stock, Ptf,2" Some time after the success of the
first tier, the bidder will pay a lower price for the remaining 49.9999% of
the company, Ptb,2" Legally, the second-tier price is bounded below by the
appraisal value of the shares.15 We assume, along with Bradley and Ro-
senzweig and Macey and McChesney, that the appraisal rights are equal
to the pre-tender open market price, P0. The bidder will, of course, offer
this lowest possible price in the second stage. If every shareholder tenders
at the first stage, the bidder purchases its shares on a pro-rata basis. Thus
14. We advert here to the problem of agency costs. See, e.g., Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the
Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
For a useful collection of recent work, see PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS
(J. Pratt & R. Zeckhauser eds. 1985). A sophisticated survey of agency cost models is given in 0.
HART & B. HOLMSTROM, THE THEORY OF CONTRACTS 8-52 (Massachusetts Institute of Technol-
ogy Department of Economics Working Paper No. 418, Mar. 1986).
15. Also constraining the second tier are fiduciary duty doctrines that restrict the acquiror's ability
to pay less than the pre-tender open market price of P0. Bradley and Rosenzweig want to challenge
these assumptions. See infra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
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if every shareholder tenders, the value of a two-tier tender is the average
of the front end and the back end (the pre-tender open market price), that
is, Pt,2  (Ptf,2 + P0)/2, which exceeds the value of not tendering. If
some do not tender, then tendering shareholders sell a greater portion of
their shares at the first-tier price, and their profits from tendering rise.
More important, in the absence of a means for coordinating shareholder
response, the optimum shareholder strategy is to tender even if sharehold-
ers believe that the value of the tender is below the "true" value of their
shares. (Such shareholders would be anticipating a market revaluation of
the firm or, more likely, a higher bid from a third party.) A shareholder
who fails to tender into a successful bid loses the difference between the
weighted value of the bid and the back end price (Pt,2 - P0 ). A shareholder
who tenders into an unsuccessful bid suffers no loss. Thus tendering
"dominates" not tendering in this situation.1
With these preliminaries in mind we turn to the specifics of target stock
buybacks.
II. OPEN MARKET REPURCHASES
Bradley and Rosenzweig consider two buyback strategies: open market
repurchases and self-tenders. They find open market stock repurchases
objectionable on the claim that the discriminatory effects on target share-
holders will defeat value-increasing interfirm bids. On the other hand,
Bradley and Rosenzweig claim that self-tenders are generally permissible
because they do not distort shareholder choice (shares are purchased pro
rata) 17 and because they create an auction for the firm's resources among
competing management teams. In particular, Bradley and Rosenzweig
contend that self-tender offers enable target managers to defeat value-
decreasing, but not value-increasing, bids. In this section we focus on open
market repurchases.
Bradley and Rosenzweig's own example provides the easiest context in
which to analyze their model of the distortion of shareholder choice by
16. The dominance of "tendering" over "not tendering" is a consequence of the implicit assump-
tions on price formation made, implicitly, in both models. Both models assume that target sharehold-
ers have identical beliefs about the value of the firm. If one relaxes this assumption, other equilibrium
strategies may exist. In particular, shareholders with sufficiently high estimates of the value of the
firm might choose not to tender. See L. BEBCHuK, A MODEL OF THE OUTCOME OF TAKEOVER BIDS
(Harvard Law School Program in Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 11 (Nov. 1985)).
If markets are efficient, it is plausible to assume that shareholders (who are not insiders) estimate
that the value of the firm is equal to the market price. After all, the efficiency of the market means
precisely that investors cannot form a better estimate than the market. See Gordon & Kornhauser,
infra note 1, at 770-71.
17. This premise is subject to certain constraints regarding both the number of shares bid for and
non-discrimination against the bidder. See infra text accompanying note 42.
The Yale Law Journal
open market repurchases.18 To summarize briefly: consider a target firm
with 200 shares outstanding, trading at $40 a share prior to the bid, and
thus valued by the market at $8000. The acquiror values the firm at a
minimum of $10,000 and makes a two-tier, front-loaded bid of $60 for the
first 100 shares, $40 for the remaining shares. The prevailing market
price of target shares will increase to reflect the expected value of a ten-
dered share, $50. Target management then defends with an open market
repurchase of 120 shares at $50, which reduces the value of the firm by
$6000. The bid is withdrawn and the value of the firm falls to $2000, or
$25 a share."9 At best, the bidder will present a revised bid substantially
below $50. Thus the remaining shareholders will have financed the pre-
mium received by the lucky open market sellers.
20
This scenario produces a very important result: Upon announcement of
the open market repurchase program, target shareholders will sell their
shares on the market rather than tender to the bidder. Selling "domi-
nates" tendering, meaning that shareholders will sometimes do better by
selling than by tendering, and will never do worse. A selling shareholder
receives at least $50 a share. A non-selling shareholder ends up with
shares worth $25. Thus, according to Bradley and Rosenzweig, an open
market repurchase amounts to payout of a special dividend to selling
shareholders that distorts the shareholder decision. This results in the de-
feat of a bid which would raise the value of the firm from $8000 to
$10,000. Therefore, open market repurchases are objectionable.
Bradley and Rosenzweig's model and policy conclusions rely, however,
on a buried assumption and a buried policy goal. The buried assumption
is that the source of the gains to the bidder is simply better management
of target resources, irrespective of the nature of the original mismanage-
ment.2" The buried policy goal is that tender offers should be encouraged
18. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 7, at 1387-99.
19. The computation is: $8000 pre-bid value of the firm, minus $6000 payout, equals $2000.
This amount divided by 80 outstanding shares equals $25 a share.
20. We follow the example of Bradley and Rosenzweig, but confess some perplexity over why the
open market price at which the target repurchase occurs should be $50. Presumably, if shareholders
believe the tender will succeed, none will sell on the market for less than $50. If, however, the open
market repurchase produces the expectation that the tender will not succeed, the open market price
should fall to reflect both the expected failure of the bid and the dilution in value of the un-
repurchased shares. Moreover, the recognition that the repurchase program will reduce the value of
the unrepurchased shares should increase shareholders' willingness to sell and discourage others from
buying. Overall, this argument suggests that the price will likely fall below $50. On the other hand,
considerations not related to the market may drive management's repurchase decision; hence, manage-
ment may be supporting the $50 price. Assumptions on the price formation process play a crucial, but
unexplicated, role in the model.
21. Bradley and Rosenzweig do not distinguish among the following types of possible mismanage-
ment: failure to derive maximum economic return from some or all assets within the firm; failure to
recognize and act on synergy gains from combining some or all of the firm's assets with assets of other
firms; and failure to obtain competitive prices in sales of assets to other firms.
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because they generally increase incentives for management to maximize
shareholder wealth. Because they do not make these points explicit in
their discussion, Bradley and Rosenzweig fail to explain why it is impor-
tant that the particular $60/40 bid succeed rather than that some value-
maximizing bid or transaction occur.
We find that these issues are best examined by focusing on the financ-
ing of an open market repurchase. For simplicity, assume that the repur-
chase will be financed through cash that has been generated by the sale of
target assets to a third party. 2 Two questions must be answered. First,
are the assets in question mismanaged by the target? Second, do we expect
the sale of the assets by the target to be mismanaged? The key assumption
for Bradley and Rosenzweig is that the sale is mismanaged; they do not
seem to dispute that assets will end up in the hands of the most efficient
managers after the repurchase. Changing the mismanaged sale assump-
tion tests the basis of opposition to open market repurchases.
To expand this point in terms of Bradley and Rosenzweig's example,
consider that target management can mismanage such assets in three
ways. It may universally mismanage assets, so that competent manage-
ment could achieve 125% of present returns (the ratio of the bid to the
pre-bid market price, 10,000/8000). It may mismanage specific assets, so
that the percentage of the gain obtained by competent management de-
pends upon the ratio of such specific assets to all assets. It may misman-
age in the refusal to approve a merger in which such assets would produce
synergies.
Now consider what happens when target management sells assets to
finance the repurchase. In the universal mismanagement case (Case I),
management should be able to realize the competitive value of the assets
sold; in other words, it should be able to obtain a price that reflects the
value of the assets to competent management. Although a particular man-
agement may be unable to put assets to highest use, it does not follow that
it will also mismanage a sale of such assets. Thus, in contrast to the ex-
ample, target management could finance the purchase of 120 shares at
$50 a share without reducing the stakes of remaining shareholders. Man-
agement would sell assets valued in its hands at $4800, but would realize
the competitive price of $6000. The remaining value of the firm under
present management would be $3200, or $40 a share for the remaining 80
22. We also assume that shareholders have the opportunity to observe the financing decision,
including the outcome of the asset sale, prior to their decision to sell or tender. If the shareholders do
not have this opportunity, the analysis should depend upon shareholder beliefs about the degree of
mismanagement of the sale as well as target management's actual competence in handling the sale.
However, in the simple model of price formation used by Bradley and Rosenzweig, shareholder beliefs
play little or no role. The analysis also applies where the repurchase is financed through the target's
cash on hand, or, in a more complex form, where it is financed through debt.
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shares. However, a bidder could still enhance the returns from the firm's
assets by 125%. The value of the firm to the bidder would be $4000, or
$50 a share. In other words, the bidder should leave open its $50 a share
bid. Thus this particular repurchase is not objectionable on shareholder
wealth maximization grounds, because assets either have been or will be
transferred to the most efficient managers. Nor is it objectionable on
shareholder fairness grounds, because all shareholders have the opportu-
nity to realize $50-a share, despite differential treatment.2 Thus the open
market repurchase program does not distort shareholder choice.
4
The specific asset mismanagement case (Case II) is more complicated.
To illustrate, assume that 50% of the target's assets are mismanaged, so
that competent management could achieve 150% of present returns from
such assets. Under this assumption, the value of the target to the bidder is
still $10,000. Case IIA: Once again, target management sells its misman-
aged assets at the competitive market price of $6000, enough to finance
the repurchase program. The remaining value of the firm in the hands of
present managers is $4000, or $50 a share. Shareholder wealth has been
maximized because assets are now in the hands of the most efficient man-
agers. Despite the differential treatment, all shareholders are equally well
off; some shareholders have received a paym~nt of $50 a share, and others
hold shares now worth $50 each.2  The effect of the repurchase program
may be to defeat the bid-because the value of the target has already been
maximized, not because wealth effects have distorted shareholder choice.
Case IIB: Target management sells its well managed assets for $4000,
and another $1333 of mismanaged assets for $2000, to finance the repur-
23. In the real world, it is ordinarily preferable to realize $50 now rather than $50 later. How-
ever, the Bradley and Rosenzweig model avoids this complication by assuming that at all times after
the tender offer is announced, the prevailing market price will be $50 IP, 2 = (P,, 2 + P0)/2], and
that shareholders will be indifferent between selling and tendering. An open market repurchase pro-
gram provides additional impetus to sell rather than tender.
24. It might be more plausible to assume that the target mismanages the assets to a greater degree
than it mismanages the sale, but that it still fails to realize full value for the assets. In that case, the
sale of assets will dilute the value of the remaining shares to below $40 per share, but the tender offer
will still be desirable for the acquiror. Note further that even under Bradley and Rosenzweig's as-
sumption of complete mismanagement of the sale in this case, the acquiror would still benefit from the
acquisition. In target management's hands, the firm is worth $25 per share, but in the acquiror's
hands it is worth $31.25 per share. Thus the repurchase will ward off the acquisition only if the
transaction costs of completing the acquisition exceed $6.25 per share. As the extent of the misman-
agement of asset sales decreases, the difference between the value per share of the remaining assets to
the acquiror and the value of the remaining assets to target management increases to the $10 initial
price differential.
25. The result in the text holds as long as the percentage of mismanaged assets is less than 50%.
If mismanaged assets exceed 50%, then after financing the open market purchases on these facts, the
target will still retain some mismanaged assets. The value of its shares will rise from $40 a share to
somewhat less than $50 a share. The mismanaged assets still provide an incentive for the takeover,
since the bidder would still be willing to pay $50 a share. The bidder would withdraw the bid only if
the expected gains were less than the transaction costs of completing the acquisition.
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chase program. The remaining value of the firm in the hands of present
management is $2666, or $33 a share. On the assumption that competent
managers could achieve 150% of present returns on the target's misman-
aged assets, nothing in the scenario should lead the bidder to withdraw or
revise its $50 a share bid for the remaining shares. Once again, assets are
transferred to the most efficient managers, and shareholders are equally
well off."6
The final case (Case III), the refused synergy gains merger, is also
complicated. Case IIIA: Assume that the target's assets would provide
synergy gains to a wide variety of firms. Then, as in Case I, financing the
repurchase program through a competitive sale of assets would not affect
the bidder's $50 bid and thus would not affect shareholder wealth. Case
IIIB: Assume that the target's assets would provide synergy gains only to
the bidder. Management would sell assets valued in its hands at $6000.
The remaining value of the firm would be $2000, or $25 a share. Assume,
as a worst case, that the assets sold off were the source of the special
synergy gains. The bidder withdraws the offer. In this case, assets would
not be transferred to the most efficient managers,27 and the remaining
shareholders would be disadvantaged. Their shares should trade for $25.28
This case generates a whipsaw effect on target shareholders.
Thus, on the assumption that the sale of target assets is well managed,
we have shown that open market repurchases do not necessarily decrease
shareholder wealth or treat shareholders unfairly. We have also identified,
however, one limited case in which open market repurchases do raise
these problems and thus produce distorted choice.2 Where open market
26. This result holds for a class of cases in which the target sells a mixture of well-managed and
mismanaged assets to finance the open market repurchase.
27. Assuming that the special synergy assets are transferred intact to a purchaser, the bidder may
transfer the bid, and eventually the assets will reach the party who can put them to best use. Of
course, the transaction costs of additional bids reduce efficiency gains.
28. Case IIB is the limit of a series of cases in which the bidder sells special synergy-gain assets
to finance an open market repurchase program. Where only part of the special synergy assets were
sold, the bidder would revise its bid, rather than withdraw it, to take advantage of gains still available.
In a sense, all of these cases are inconsistent with the well-managed sale assumption, because in the
instance of special synergy gains, the only well-managed sale is to the bidder.
29. This is not to say that a defensive open market repurchase program will not result in acquired
shares. Shareholders may indeed sell rather than tender, but they may do so for the arbitrage reasons
that typically lead shareholders to sell rather than tender in most contested takeover situations. See
supra note 23. The Bradley and Rosenzweig model, and our discussion, assume for simplicity that the
probability of the bidder's success is 1.0, and thus that the market price will be $50. In fact, the
probability is lower-as will be the prevailing price. Shareholders are willing to transfer the risk of a
bid's failing to a specialized group of risk bearers, arbitrageurs, who stand to realize the difference
between the market price and the bid. Insofar as the announcement of defensive open market repur-
chases and associated tactics decreases the likelihood of success, the spread between the market price
and the bid should increase. The increased spread, of course, reduces the payoff to the shareholder
who sells in the open market and, commensurately, the risk of dissipation of target assets; i.e., it
reduces the whipsaw effect even if the rest of the Bradley and Rosenzweig model holds.
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repurchases are financed through disposal of assets that would produce
synergy gains only for the bidder, target management destroys the bidder's
objectives in initiating the offer.
Does this showing justify open market repurchases? The answer is no.
Even on favorable assumptions about target management's skill in the sale
of assets, target shareholders are never better off, and are sometimes worse
off, than if the open market repurchases had never occurred. If share-
holder wealth can only remain constant or decrease, then the transaction
costs of open market repurchases, and any associated bidder response, are
deadweight losses. In light of the desirability of encouraging tender offers,
there seems to be no reason to permit a defensive tactic that will never
increase shareholder wealth."0
This leads us to questions curiously unasked by Bradley and Rosen-
zweig. How do open market repurchases defeat or hinder bids? Why do
targets make them? One possible explanation, derived from the discussion
above, is that the sale of special synergy assets might eliminate the motiva-
tion for the bid, and the distribution of resulting cash through the open
market repurchase avoids the risk to target management of an attractive
cash hoard. 1 Another possible explanation is that an open market repur-
chase quickly enhances the influence of a management-controlled or oth-
erwise friendly block. In our hypothetical, if management owns 20 of the
remaining 80 shares, its tactical position becomes stronger; at the limit of
41 shares, it becomes impregnable. But how does management avoid re-
ducing its wealth in this way? Puzzles for another day.
III. SELF-TENDERS
Recall Bradley and Rosenzweig's argument in favor of self-tenders.
First, they argue that unlike open market repurchases, self-tenders do not
have the potential for discrimination among shareholders and therefore
cannot distort shareholder choice as between self-tenders and interfirm
bids. Second, self-tenders generally enhance competition among manage-
ment teams for firm resources. Third, and most important, self-tenders
30. The only circumstance in which a defensive open market repurchase may conceivably serve
shareholder interests is the case where target management realizes more in the disposal of assets than
the bidder has offered. Since the value of the target to remaining shareholders would be enhanced by
such an open market repurchase and associated asset sale, the shareholder's decision to sell would not
be distorted. This case assumes at least a partial failure in the market for corporate control or, alter-
natively, target management's ability to exploit its superior knowledge of target assets with a third
party purchaser. It seems improbable to us that very many target managements will be successful in
this way. But this case does lead to the shareholder wealth maximization conundrum previously
avoided: namely, whether defensive tactics that improve the lot of shareholders of a particular firm are
nonetheless objectionable because such tactics discourage other bids and thus reduce shareholder
wealth generally. See supra text accompanying notes 2-6.
31. See also infra note 41 (discussing distribution of cash hoard in self-tender).
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enable target managements to defeat value-decreasing but not value-
increasing bids.
3 1
One immediate objection to self-tenders derives from the earlier discus-
sion of the financing of open market repurchases. If the target finances the
self-tender through the sale of special synergy assets, the bidder may sim-
ply withdraw its bid. Regardless of the self-tender price, shareholder
wealth will decrease. In this .sense, a self-tender can defeat a value-
increasing bid. One might, however, regard this example not as an objec-
tion to self-tenders per se, but to the preceding asset sale, which could
have occurred anyway. Is there a more general and direct objection to self-
tenders?
First consider the general management competition argument offered in
support of self-tenders. At the time of the interfirm bid, target manage-
ment already has had an opportunity to demonstrate its ability to maxi-
mize returns. The willingness of an interfirm bidder to offer a premium
over market price suggests that in some way target management has lost
the competition. A self-tender does not replicate an auction process, in
which the highest valuing user gains control of the assets. Target manag-
ers (unlike managers who attempt a management buyout) are spending
the shareholders' money, not their own funds. As shown by the discussion
of the financing of defensive stock repurchases, a self-tender would at best
lead target management to sell assets to those who could manage them
better. But such sales might dissipate target assets and impose deadweight
transaction costs. A management competition argument is a poor justifica-
tion for these risks.
Moreover, this particular competition is loaded in favor of target man-
agement. The strategic calculus of two-tier tender offers clearly favors
bids that offer the highest front end and maximize the spread between the
front and back ends."3 Thus A's bid of $70 a share for 50.0001% of the
32. On the assumption that target management will mismanage the sale of assets, Bradley and
Rosenzweig claim that the value-maximizing interfirm bid of 360/S40 always defeats the self-tender,
because the assets are worth $10,000 to the bidder and only $8000 in the hands of the target. Assum-
ing, as Bradley and Rosenzweig do, that target and bidder compete for equal numbers of shares, the
bidder can use its surplus of $2000 to top any offer that the target is capable of making. Even when
the assumption about the target's ability to sell assets is relaxed, the bidder has the edge because of its
higher valuation of target assets.
33. See, e.g., M. Bradley & E. Kim, The Tender Offer as a Takeover Device: Its Evolution, the
Free Rider Problem, and the Prisoner's Dilemma 23-24 (Apr. 1985) (unpublished manuscript).
The discussion in the text, following Bradley and Rosenzweig, considers only the case initiated by a
hostile two-tiered bid or a hostile partial bid, which has an implicit back end of the post-bid market
price. It does not consider the case of a hostile "any-or-all" bid (in which the bidder bids for all shares
at a uniform price). There is evidence that in a competition among third party bidders, an any-or-all
bid generally prevails over a two-tier bid with a higher front end but a lower blended price. See SEC
Office of Chief Economist, The Economics of Partial and Two-Tier Tender Offers, Securities Ex-
change Release No. 21,079 [1984] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 83,637, at 86,926 (June 21, 1984).
The dynamics of a self-tender versus an any-or-all interfirm bid might lead to a different result. First,
The Yale Law Journal
target's stock and $50 for the balance will defeat B's bid of $65 a share
for 50.0001% and $55 a share for the balance, even though A and B
equally value the target." In a competition between target management
and an interfirm bidder, the crucial question will be what constrains tar-
get management at the back end. Interfirm bidders are constrained by
appraisal statutes, fiduciary duty doctrines, and more recently, fair price
charter amendments which assure target shareholders of at least the pre-
bid price for their shares." In effect, any self-tender contains as a back
end the value of the remaining shares. This back end is not constrained.
Whatever liquidation and distribution occur in the course of a self-tender
will be pro-rata, which will make it very difficult for holders of remaining
shares, no matter how reduced in value, to object.
The result is that target management will almost always be able to
structure a self-tender that defeats an interfirm bid, even where the bidder
values the target more highly. For example, in the hypothetical under dis-
cussion, assume the bidder values the target shares at $50 each. Appraisal
statutes and fair price charter provisions set $40 as the floor for the back-
end of a two-tier offer. The bidder's strongest offer is $60 for the first 100
shares, $40 for the balance. Assume, as do Bradley and Rosenzweig, that
target management could not generate more than $8000 for a competitive
bid (an assumption which we, of course, challenge). Even so, target man-
agement can design a competing self-tender that will prevail: $65 for 100
shares. The remaining shares, in effect the back end of its offer, are worth
$15 each.
target management is likely to tender shares; the hostile bidder may or may not tender shares. These
decisions will affect the value after prorationing of the self-tender for other shareholders. Second, the
self-tender may not thwart a hostile bid, but may merely lead to a lower price. In any event, the any-
or-all interfirm bid does not present the distorted shareholder choice problems that concern Bradley
and Rosenzweig, in particular the value-decreasing bid. See supra text accompanying note 32.
34. Compare a bid by A and a bid by B, both of which value the entire firm equally, but in which
the front end of A is higher than the front end of B. If even one shareholder fails to tender, tendering
shareholders will do better tendering to A rather than B because each tendering shareholder will now
receive more than his pro-rata share of the common valuation of the firm. Moreover, since the front
end is paid out immediately and the back end somewhat later, after a take-out, the time value of
money favors A's bid.
Implicitly, of course, we (and Bradley and Rosenzweig) assume that no more shareholders will
tender to A than to B. If, contrary to this assumption, more shareholders would tender to A than to B,
the value of a tender to B might be higher than the value of a tender to A, because a greater percent-
age of shares tendered to B are taken in the front end. Following the example in the text, assume 10
shareholders each holding 10 shares: if all shareholders would tender to A but only 6 to B, each
shareholder tendering to A would receive $600 after the blend of the front and back ends, but each
shareholder tendering to B would receive approximately $630. This point, however, may be more
relevant for a party trying to design the strongest initial bid than for a party anticipating an auction.
Only one bid can succeed in the A versus B case (although, ironically both the self-tender and in-
terfirm tender could succeed), and a shareholder can tender to only.one bid. If the shareholder expects
that either bid would draw more than 50%, the dominant strategy would be to tender to A.
35. Fair price charter amendments generally mandate that shareholders receive equivalent consid-
eration in both parts of a two-tier bid, in effect eliminating the front load.
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Bradley and Rosenzweig have two responses to this objection."0 First,
they question whether a bidder is in fact constrained by appraisal statutes
or fair price charter provisions, which operate only where the bidder fol-
lows up a front-loaded offer with a take-out of the back end. They argue
that because a bidder can delay paying off the back end, it can lower the
effective price through undetectable self-dealing over time. Thus target
managers do not have a competitive advantage over bidders in this respect.
Apart from whether such behavior by a putative majority shareholder
should be condoned, Professor Carney persuasively argues that the trig-
gering take-out will almost always occur shortly after the bid is accepted.
In particular, well-drafted fair price charter amendments operate to force
a take-out at virtually the first instances of self-dealing, at least some of
which will be detectable.
3 7
Bradley and Rosenzweig's second response to this objection is that ap-
praisal rights and fair price charter provisions should cease to operate in
the wake of a defensive self-tender.3" But this "modest proposal" would
work a major change in corporate law. The purpose of appraisal rights
and fair price charter provisions is to protect minority shareholders in
corporate control contests. Presumably, Bradley and Rosenzweig would
agree that these protections are part of a shareholder bargain, whether
implicit (the "standard form" appraisal statute) or explicit (the charter
provision). To abrogate such protections on the basis of conduct by target
management would defeat their express purpose.
Finally, we must ask, what is the payoff for the assumptions and insti-
tutional changes that Bradley and Rosenzweig require? The payoff is the
availability of the self-tender as a weapon, if not the ultimate weapon,
against a value-decreasing bid. Two examples of such bids are an explicit
two-tier bid in which the front end is above the prevailing market price
but the back end is below (Case A), and an implicit two-tier bid by a
"corporate raider" who offers a premium to acquire majority ownership
but then will self-deal or otherwise expropriate the wealth of remaining
shareholders over time (Case B). In such circumstances, since the firm is
36. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 7, at 1419 n.150.
37. Carney, supra note 2, at 383-84. Moreover, many lawyers would be surprised at the Bradley
and Rosenzweig claim that "Only a few courts recognize majority shareholder fiduciary obligations to
the minority." Bradley & Rosenzweig, at 1415 n.138. See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP Inc., 457 A.2d
701 (Del. 1983) (enforcing majority shareholders' fiduciary obligation to minority in context of take-
out merger); Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971) (parent owes fiduciary duty
to subsidiary); AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS, § 5.14 (Tent. Draft No. 3, Apr. 13, 1984). Apart from the trigger of target
charter amendments, many bidders will want to effect a take-out quickly as part of their plans to
finance the transaction, for example, through partial liquidation of target assets.
38. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 7, at 1419 n.150.
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valued more highly in the hands of target management than by the value-
decreasing bidder, a self-tender will prevail.
In short, Bradley and Rosenzweig assume that alternative deterrents to
a value-decreasing bid, namely, legal rules designed to prevent "raiding,"
and the market for corporate control, are unreliable. We have already
discussed briefly how fiduciary duty rules and fair price charter provisions
might limit the bidder's ability to offer explicitly or implicitly a back end
price below the pre-bid market price. More important is the market for
corporate control. Take Case A, the explicit value-decreasing bid. If the
gaming dynamics of such a bid would indeed constrain shareholders to
tender, then presumably the prevailing market price of the target's shares
would fall below the pre-bid price.3 9 The price change should alert other
potential bidders, who, with very little investment in information, would
realize the existence of an undervalued firm and enter the bidding. To
suppose otherwise requires an assumption of large scale failure in the
market for corporate control that seems very unrealistic.
Turn now to Case B, the implicit value-decreasing bid. Bradley and
Rosenzweig seem to hypothesize a situation in which target management
knew of the bidder's nefarious back end intentions (and so would be justi-
fied in initiating a self-tender), but the market did not (and thus did not
emit its price signal to corporate control arbitrageurs as in Case A). This
scenario seems, in general, highly implausible. Presumably target man-
agement would attempt to inform the market of the character of the bid-
der; the market price should reflect whether target management or the
bidder has more credibility. If the conjecture has any force, it is only in
the case of very small firms, perhaps not exchange-listed, as to which the
market may not be well-informed.4 But we should not let these conjec-
tural problems in the smallest end of the market, with the least welfare
implications, drive our conclusions.'
1
39. The price will fall because the prevailing market price will be a weighted average of the front
and the back ends (assuming a probability of success of the bid of 1.0). It is also the price movement
predicted by the more formal account in Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 7, at 1390-93.
40. In general, the conjectures by Bradley and Rosenzweig about the failure of competitive mar-
kets in corporate control seem likely to apply only where the targets are small, because the relatively
fixed costs of presenting a bid may be high, on a percentage basis, in comparison to the gains.
41. One reader of an earlier draft of this paper suggested that self-tenders may protect against
"bootstrap" acquisitions in which the bidder proposes to finance the transaction entirely with the
target's cash hoard and loans secured by the target's assets. Since the bidder's only risk is the transac-
tion costs associated with making the bid, the argument goes, the incentives to undertake such a raid
will be very high in the absence of a defensive tactic like the self-tender. This argument is not persua-
sive in our view. Even if one accepted the controversial assumption that such transactions would not
lead to more efficient management of target assets, the case for the self-tender is not made. A target
sitting atop a large cash hoard could simply pay out a special dividend to shareholders, which, unlike
the defensive self-tender, would not discriminate against the bidder who forced management to dis-
gorge this underutilized cash. (The discrimination would arise from the bidder's unwillingness to
tender its shares.)
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The broader question that Bradley and Rosenzweig raise for corporate
law scholarship is the appropriate use of law and economics models as a
basis for policy prescriptions. The initial power of their model stems from
its strong policy conclusions, apparently based on existing arrangements,
about controversial target defensive tactics. Bradley and Rosenzweig
boldly assert that a target's open market stock repurchase in response to a
tender offer is objectionable, but that another form of defensive stock
buyback, the self-tender, is not objectionable-indeed, that it serves a com-
pelling purpose. Then the qualifications begin: First, the self-tender must
be for no fewer than the number of shares in the interfirm bid. Second, it
must not discriminate against the interfirm bidder. Both of these changes
diverge from present arrangements. Finally, the rabbit emerges from the
hat-in the form of a footnote:42 The scheme works only if accompanied
by an additional significant and highly controversial change-the abroga-
tion of appraisal rights and fair price charter provisions. Without these
changes, self-tenders could become a major abuse. Not only do we find
Bradley and Rosenzweig's model limited in application, we also question
the gain that would arise from their policy prescription. Absent assump-
tions about radical market inefficiencies, the potential gains are likely to
be very small and the potential losses very high. Yet all this becomes clear
only after laborious unraveling.
IV. GREENMAIL
A targeted share repurchase, or greenmail, is the buyback of the shares
owned by a particular shareholder of the target who has made, or
threatened, a takeover bid. The greenmail payment is typically at a pre-
mium over the prevailing market price.43 Macey and McChesney contest
the standard account of greenmail which argues that greenmail serves
management entrenchment objectives only; that is, that management,
which has mismanaged target assets, pays greenmail in order to perpetu-
ate its ability to exploit the target.4" According to this account greenmail
should be prohibited because it decreases shareholder wealth and discrimi-
nates unfairly among shareholders in the distribution of corporate assets.45
42. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 7, at 1419 n.150.
43. Some would say that a buyback of the bidder's stock at any price over the pre-bid price, Po,
constitutes greenmail. Others, particularly target managements, would limit greenmail to a payment
at more than the prevailing market price at the time of the payment, P,,. The choice must depend on
one's beliefs about the effect of the payment of greenmail on the post-payment share price. If the
share price falls to Po, the appropriate benchmark price is Pa, at least when adopting a criterion based
on equal treatment of shareholders.
44. See generally Note, Greenmail: Targeted Stock Repurchases and the Management-
Entrenchment Hypothesis, 98 HARV. L. REv. 1045 (1985) (proposing prohibition of greenmail).
45. See Macey & McChesney, supra note 8, at 14-15.
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Macey and McChesney contend, in contrast, that greenmail, although
discriminatory, may maximize shareholder wealth in a "fair" way. They
see greenmail as a step occasionally necessary to instigate an auction for
the target. Macey and McChesney's argument has a theoretical and an
empirical prong. First, they offer a hypothetical transaction in which a
greenmail payment increases shareholder wealth because another bidder
arrives offering a higher price. Second, they point to empirical evidence
demonstrating that while on average the value of greenmail-paying targets
declines after the payment of greenmail (relative to P.,3), the value of
some targets increases (relative to P0 and even to Pm,3)" These facts, they
suggest, confirm that their hypothetical transactions sometimes occur. On
the basis of this two-pronged argument, Macey and McChesney argue
that the standard policy recommendation proscribing greenmail should be
reconsidered. While they do not advocate a specific rule, their further ar-
guments that greenmail neither discourages the production of information
about undervalued firms, nor wastefully consumes real resources, suggest
that they favor a legal rule permitting greenmail under some
circumstances.
46
Yet arguing against a prohibition of greenmail requires more than sim-
ply demonstrating that some value-increasing greenmail transactions may
exist. It requires as well an alternative greenmail rule that will produce,
over all transactions, more gains than losses. To evaluate the feasibility of
any such rule requires that one examine Macey and McChesney's im-
plicit model with regard to the full range of potential transactions. Thus




46. In conversation, Jon Macey has suggested that he opposes a general proscription of green-
mail. He would prefer to allow courts to articulate a legal rule that permits all, and only, those
payments that promote shareholder wealth maximization.
47. Macey and McChesney's analysis may be motivated by a misunderstanding of the empirical
literature on greenmail. Conceding that the literature shows that on average losses outweigh gains
relative to P. 3, Macey and McChesney nevertheless infer that the existence of some transactions
associated with gains demonstrates the desirability of some greenmail payments. Macey & McChes-
ney, supra note 8, at 47-48. However, this inference misperceives the statistical techniques in the
empirical literature. Such studies merely determine to what extent an event, such as a greenmail
payment, is associated with a change in a firm's share price. But price changes are noisy signals, often
affected by significant factors different from the event under study, i.e., confounding events. For exam-
ple, a firm may make another important announcement on the same day of the greenmail agreement,
such as a proposed recapitalization or unexpected earnings. Thus it is important to examine the price
effects for many firms in order to distill the extent of the association and to filter out factors extrane-
ous to the studied event. Averages are critical in this process. See Romano, Law as a Product: Some
Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225, 266 (1985) ("Because the event study
methodology groups the stocks of firms undergoing the specified event into one portfolio, the variable
of interest is an average residual."). To sustain their claim that greenmail payments on occasion have
been desirable for shareholders, Macey and McChesney would have to examine individual transac-
tions and explain how the greenmail payment led to shareholder gains. Compare Lease, McConnell &
Mikkelson, The Market Value of Control in Publicly-Traded Corporations, 11 J. FIN. EcoN. 439
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In Macey and McChesney's model, greenmail will be desirable for
shareholders only (1) when target management has more favorable beliefs
than the initial bidder about the arrival of other, higher-valuing bidders,
and (2) when those beliefs are more accurate.48 Unless both of those con-
ditions are met, a greenmail payment is likely to decrease shareholder
wealth. Because information about the value of the target and the likeli-
hood of other bidders is not equally shared by target management and an
initial bidder, it is important to consider which party is likely to have
superior information. In this regard the analysis must separately consider
conscientious management (which always acts in the interest of the share-
holders) and self-interested management (which exploits its agency rela-
tionship with shareholders to its own advantage).
Our objections become clearer in the context of Macey and McChes-
ney's own example.49 The target company has 101 shares outstanding
with the pre-tender market price of $30. An acquiror (B1) values the as-
sets at $37 per share. First, it purchases one share at $30. It then makes a
front-loaded two-tier offer of $40 for 50 shares, and $30 for the remaining
50 shares. Under this set of facts, the bid is desirable for both the acquiror
and the shareholders. Each shareholder, if all tender, realizes a profit of
$5 per share; the acquiror realizes a profit of $2 per share, for a total of
$207.50 In this case, payment of greenmail means a management offer of
more than $30 for the single share held by the acquiror in exchange for a
withdrawal of its tender offer.
According to Macey and McChesney, such a greenmail payment will
maximize shareholder wealth if a potential third party (B2) exists who
values the target's assets at more than $37 per share. In their example, B2
values the target at $39 per share. Macey and McChesney's argument has
two steps. First, greenmail is necessary because the acquiror's front-loaded
offer will induce shareholders to tender even if a higher bid is likely, so
long as the higher bid is not yet made. Second, there exists a greenmail
payment that the acquiror would accept and which would yield to share-
holders, after an acquisition by B2 at $39 per share, a profit (net of the
greenmail payment) of more than $5 per share.
(1983) (event study aggregating all firms with dual class common stock) with Lease, McConnell &
Mikkelson, The Market Value of Differential Voting Rights in Closely Held Corporations, 57 J.
Bus. 443 (1984) (study of six particular firms with dual class common stock).
48. This latter assumption is not equivalent to an asselrtion that target management has more
accurate beliefs than the bidder about the value of the firm rather than about the emergence of other
bidders. Moreover, when target assets have synergistic relations with third party assets, target man-
agement may not have more accurate beliefs than the bidder about the target's value.
49. Macey & McChesney, supra note 8, at 21-22, 26-27.
50. The acquiror pays on average $35 per share for one hundred shares which it values at $37
per share, and thereby realizes a profit of $200. In addition, the acquiror gains $7 on the purchase of
the first share for $30.
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Our discussion in the introduction of the consequences of a front-loaded
bid accords with the first step of Macey and McChesney's argument.
They justify the second step in their argument as follows. Sale at $39 per
share to the third party provides an additional gain of $4 per share (or
$400 total) to current shareholders over the acquiror's offer. The acquiror
(B1) will gain only $207 from successful acquisition. Therefore a green-
mail payment between $237 and $409 for the acquiror's single share will
make both the acquiror and target shareholders better off. 1
Macey and McChesney's argument is incomplete as it stands. First, it
conceals an assumption about when a mutually acceptable bargain be-
tween management and the acquiror can be struck. Isolating this assump-
tion-that management has more favorable beliefs than the acquiror
about the prospects of a third party bid-clarifies instances in which
greenmall is desirable. Second, Macey and McChdsney implicitly assume
that target management can realize the $39 per share valuation that ex-
ceeds the acquiror's (B1) valuation of the target. We question this implicit
assumption.
Consider first the conditions under which management and the ac-
quiror may reach a greenmail agreement. Such an agreement is possible
only where management places a higher value on the firm's assets than
the acquiror does. Otherwise, no greenmail payment that management
would be willing to pay would persuade the acquiror to withdraw its bid.
Here it is important to distinguish conscientious target management from
self-interested target management. Conscientious management might value
the target's assets more highly for two reasons. First, conscientious man-
agement assesses the prospects of a third party's offer 2 more favorably
than the acquiror. s Second, conscientious management might assess the
51. When the third party acquires the target, it also acquires the 101st share held by the acquiror.
In greenmail, the target repurchases this share from which the other 100 shareholders will derive the
$39 valuation of the third party. Thus the $409 figure.
52. This assessment has two components: the likelihood of a third party making a bid and the
value of the bid made.
53. See Macey & McChesney, supra note 8, at 26-27. Macey and McChesney make this as-
sumption implicitly. Its necessity may easily be demonstrated in the context of Macey and McChes-
ney's numerical example. Suppose, for example, that the acquiror believes that no one will make a bid
for the target greater than the $37 per share value that it, the acquiror, places on the target. To
induce the acquiror to part with its shares, target shareholders must give up at least the $2 per share
profit the acquiror was going to make on the transaction. For the greenmail transaction to be desira-
ble, therefore, target shareholders must expect that a third party bidder will pay more than $37 per
share. Moreover, target shareholders must discount the expected third party bid by their assessment of
its likelihood.
In general, one would expect the acquiror's $37 per share valuation to incorporate its beliefs about
the likelihood of a higher third party bid. Thus this discussion is more general than may initially
appear. Macey and Mc(hesney themselves suggest that the acquiror might have beliefs about third
party bids independent of the acquiror's valuation of the assets in its own hands. Their discussion
suggests that if acquiror and target had identical beliefs, then the acquiror would demand the total
gain to be realized from the third party acquisition. This argument reasonably assumes that any third
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value of the target's assets as higher in its own hands than in the hands of
the acquiror, and might expect to realize this higher value for sharehold-
ers through its own management efforts." Self-interested management, on
the other hand, would focus only on the value to itself of retaining control
over the target's assets.
A. Conscientious Management
At the outset, we restrict our attention to conscientious management.
Thus either management assesses the prospect of a third party's offer
-more favorably than the acquiror or management believes that, in light of
the acquiror's actions, management can increase the value of the firm to
$39. Consider the first alternative, that target management has more
favorable beliefs about a third party bid than the acquiror. A mutually
acceptable greenmail agreement while possible, is not necessarily desira-
ble. Conscientious management may believe that the target should be val-
ued at $39 per share, but its expectations may be incorrect. Even though
the acquiror has less favorable beliefs about the prospects of a third party
bid, its beliefs may be more accurate.
Who has more accurate beliefs about the likelihood of a third party
bid? The answer may depend upon the source of the gains in the transac-
tion. The target's assets might be undervalued because they would react
synergistically with the assets of other firms or because management is
inefficient. In cases of synergistic undervaluation, target management
might reasonably be unaware of potential synergies with other assets,
while the acquiror more probably would understand the manner in which
the target's assets would enhance operations like its own. While the initial
bid may signal the existence of synergy gains, it is unlikely to inform
target management of the extent or nature of such gains, at least not as
fully as the acquiror is informed. If the acquiror has more accurate infor-
mation than the target management, a greenmail payment would be
undesirable.
If the undervaluation results from management inefficiency, target
management arguably should have more accurate beliefs, since it has the
most comprehensive knowledge about the target's current operations. But
why would conscientious management be subject to undervaluation due to
party bid available to the target would also be available to the acquiror once it had taken over the
target firm. Moreover, Macey and McChesney assume that while target and acquiror share beliefs
about the third party's valuation of the target, they differ about the likelihood that the third party will
make a bid. We maintain this assumption about beliefs; its relaxation would not alter the analysis.
54. Macey and McChesney do not consider this case, which provides a justification for greenmail
payments in circumstances that they may find objectionable. The case is, however, implicit in their
argument.
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management inefficiencies? Perhaps management is well-meaning but in-
competent. Incompetence suggests that management requires a takeover to
cure its own deficiencies; yet management's incompetence must not pre-
vent its accurate valuation of the target's assets. This combination of in-
competent management and accurate valuation is implausible.
Alternatively, management might be well-meaning but unaware. The
acquiror's bid will have directed management's attention to its own defi-
ciencies, which it now recognizes and assesses as more costly than the
acquiror had believed. Thus management might believe either that it can
convince a third party that the acquiror underestimated the extent of inef-
ficiency in the target, or that it can now manage the firm in a more provi-
dential manner. Again, we have made conflicting assumptions about the
quality of conscientious management. Here, management implements
plans well, but does not always identify profit-maximizing policies to im-
plement. While this may be plausible, it seems a thin reed on which to
base legal policy concerning greenmail.
Suppose, however, that conscientious management has both more accu-
rate and more favorable beliefs than the acquiror about the prospect of a
third party bid. As in Macey and McChesney's example, assume that B2
values the target's assets at $39 per share. How will target management
extract all of this $39 per share value for current shareholders? 5
Macey and McChesney assume that the third party bidder will pay $39
per share even after the withdrawal of the acquiror's bid. Whether this
occurs will depend upon the number of firms willing to bid for the target
and the mechanism used for determining the target's price. But suppose
only the acquiror and the third party have above-market valuations of the
target. Once the acquiror has withdrawn from the bidding, the third party
has no reason to offer its full valuation to the target. Indeed, the third
party has no incentive to offer any more than the $35 per share offered
initially. In other words, Macey and Mchesney must assume the exis-
tence of several bidders to provide competitive activity that would extract a
$39 bid. At bottom, their defense of greenmail relies on the assumption
that it will instigate an auction. 8
Once again, we should ask whether target management or the acquiror
55. For greenmail to be desirable, target management need only extract a value greater than the
$37 per share expected by the acquiror. The argument that follows in the text applies to this more
generally phrased requirement.
56. Target management may be relying not on an" auction, but on its competence at the negotiat-
ing table. Its bargaining position will be stronger with a large number of potential bidders. Absent
multiple bidders, the results of the bargaining will depend upon the distribution of information be-
tween the target and the third party as well as their relative degrees of impatience and reputations for
toughness in bargaining. See L. KORNHAUSER, A. RUBENSTEIN & C. WILSON, REPUTATION AND
THE "WAR OF ATTRmON" (New York University Department of Economics Working Paper, Feb.
1986).
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will have more accilrate beliefs about the likelihood of such an auction. If
we take seriously Macey and McChesney's belief that potential green-
mailers can expertly identify undervalued firms and exploit that informa-
tion in the market for corporate control, 5 7 then the acquiror probably
would have more accurate beliefs about the likelihood of a competitive
bidding process for the target. Thus target management's more favorable
beliefs are likely to be disappointed, and the payment of greenmail will
reduce shareholder wealth.
Our analysis of the case of conscientious management thus far has fol-
lowed Macey and McChesney in not considering the possible importance
of financial intermediaries such as investment bankers."8 Arguably, finan-
cial intermediaries improve the accuracy of target management beliefs be-
cause they have better information, especially regarding potential synergy
gains, about firms other than the target. Conscientious target management
may also give the intermediary better information than that available to
the acquiror about the extent of its own mismanagement. On the other
hand, the introduction of financial intermediaries may have little net im-
pact. First, presumably the bidder will also have access to financial in-
termediaries' information about other firms; the desirability of greenmail
requires more accurate, not equally accurate, target management beliefs
about a third party bid. Second, as noted above, conscientious manage-
ment is unlikely to be aware enough of its deficiencies to be able to reveal
them to the financial intermediary but not be able to cure them. Third,
the financial intermediary is unlikely to have significantly better informa-
tion about special synergy gains than that available to the acquiror. Thus
even allowing for the use of financial intermediaries, we cannot conclude
a priori that when conscientious target management has more favorable
beliefs, it will also have more accurate ones. As the succeeding discussion
shows, our doubts grow if we admit the possibility of self-interested
management.
B. Self-Interested Management
In this case of self-interested management, an agreement does not de-
pend on management's having more favorable beliefs about the prospects
of a third party bidder. Rather, greenmail may be paid if the value to
management of retaining control of the target exceeds the value of the
target to the bidder.
Management's valuation may be higher than the bidder's for two rea-
57. Macey & McChesney, supra note 8, at 31.
58. For a useful discussion of the role of investment bankers in corporate control contests, see
Note, Investment Bankers' Fairness Opinions in Corporate Control Transactions, 96 YALE L.J.
119, 121-24 (1986).
The Yale Law Journal
sons. First, management may simply be converting to its own use value
that should go to the shareholders. With this motive, management will
pay greenmail only if the acquiror has underestimated the extent of man-
agement inefficiency or self-dealing, so that even after the payment there
remains convertible value for management. Alternatively, management
may simply assign non-economic value to its control over the target by an
amount that will exceed the bidder's valuation. In either case, manage-
ment must believe that the greenmail payment will forestall a subsequent
takeover. If self-interested management believed that payment of green-
mail would lead to a later acquisition by a third party, it would have no
interest in paying greenmail.
To defend the payment of greenmail by self-interested management,
one must argue that while management has a more accurate and more
favorable estimate of the extent of its own inefficiency than the acquiror, it
has a less accurate and less favorable estimate of the likelihood of a third
party takeover than is warranted. How could this be? Macey and
McChesney suggest that the payment of greenmail signals the undervalu-
ation of the target to other potential bidders. 9 This suggestion alone,
however, does not sustain the argument for two reasons.
First, the greenmail signal is quite noisy. Other investors must deter-
mine the cause of the undervaluation. Is it target management inefficiency
or synergistic gains? If the acquiror operated in only one line of business,
others in that line of business might be able to easily determine the syner-
gistic possibilities of the target's assets. If, however, the acquiror were a
conglomerate, its bid would carry much less information. Not only might
its bid have been prompted by target management's inefficiency, but even
when the bid was motivated by synergy, other investors would not know
the nature of the synergies available.
Second, in order to attract other potential bidders, the greenmail trans-
action must send a signal indicating that the target is undervalued by an
amount greater than the acquiror believed. That is, the information car-
ried by the bid followed by the greenmail payment must be greater than
the amount of information in the acquiror's possession. Such a claim is
implausible. An observer of the transaction could infer only that the ac-
quiror believed that gaining control over target assets was worth less than
the greenmail payment and that target management valued control at
more than its share of the greenmail payment. Since most of the funds for
the payment come from shareholders (indeed, if management owns no eq-
uity in the firm, then management bears none of the cost of greenmail),
59. Macey & McChesney, supra note 8, at 24-25.
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the observer cannot even conclude for certain that anyone places a value
on control over target assets in excess of the greenmail payment.
Furthermore, if we introduce financial intermediaries, the case for pay-
ment of greenmail by self-interested management grows even weaker. Af-
ter all, we would expect that an investment banker would improve the
accuracy of target management's beliefs about the prospects of a third
party bid. Yet shareholders will want self-interested management to pay
greenmail only in those cases in which it expects target management to
have less accurate and less favorable beliefs than the acquiror.
Our analysis has suggested that the circumstances in which sharehold-
ers would want management to pay greenmail are extremely limited.
Shareholders would want management to pay greenmail only (1) when
conscientious management has more accurate and more favorable beliefs
about the prospects of a third party bid, or (2) when self-interested man-
agement has more accurate and more favorable beliefs about the true
value of the firm than the acquiror but less accurate and less favorable
beliefs about the prospects of a successful third party bid. These circum-
stances are highly unlikely. Unfortunately, shareholders are likely to have
less accurate beliefs about the value of the assets than either management
or an acquiror. Shareholders are unlikely, then, to be able to draft con-
tracts that identify the circumstances under which management should be
permitted to pay greenmail. Instead, shareholders must either proscribe
greenmail or rely on a legal rule to protect them. What legal rule is sug-
gested by our analysis?
C. Legal Rules
The ideal legal rule would permit value-increasing greenmail payments
and prohibit value-decreasing ones. Such a rule would be difficult, if not
impossible, to formulate. Consider first a liability rule which would hold
management responsible for losses to shareholders if the value of the firm
did not increase after the payment of greenmail. Under this rule, manage-
ment would rarely pay greenmail without express shareholder approval.
Management, however, might often refuse to pay greenmail when share-
holders, ex ante, would have desired the payment. The desirability of a
greenmail payment depends upon an accurate assessment of the prospects
of a better offer. A management facing prospective losses if the better offer
does not appear would almost invariably reduce its risk by not paying
greenmail.
Another class of legal rules would condition payment of greenmail on
observable characteristics of the transaction. Our analysis of greenmail has
identified some circumstances under which payments would be desirable,
but the analysis has turned largely on characteristics that are difficult to
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specify, and on factual conjectures that seem unlikely. Indeed, our analysis
suggests that the empirical instances of favorable greenmail payments
cited by Macey and McChesney arise strictly by chance. In a certain
number of cases, for example, self-interested management may simply be
wrong in its unfavorable assessment of the likelihood of a third party
bid."0 If chance elements predominate, then no legal rule is likely to iden-
tify ex ante desirable greenmail payments."1
We are tempted at this point to favor a rule proscribing greenmail en-
tirely. The evidence shows that greenmail leads, in the aggregate, to
shareholder welfare losses. Even assuming that some transactions may
turn out well for shareholders,"2 we have failed to devise a mechanism to
separate desirable from undesirable transactions ex ante. Indeed, on the
Macey and McChesney assumption of self-interested management,e3 the
case against greenmail seems fairly strong. Only. the conscientious man-
agement case presents the possibility of a desirable greenmail payment,
but that specific case and the required special circumstances are very diffi-
cult to observe.
One final possibility is a rule that would proscribe greenmail absent
approval of the specific transaction by a majority of the disinterested
shareholders. Apart from addressing the problem of target management
self-interest, such a rule might induce production of information relevant
to the source and extent of undervaluation. In making the greenmail sig-
nal less "noisy," this rule might actually improve prospects for a higher
third party bid.
V. CONCLUSION
Our analysis of the cases presented by Bradley and Rosenzweig and
Macey and McChesney in favor of target stock buybacks makes us skepti-
cal of the claim that such transactions will increase shareholder wealth.
On the other hand, the deficiencies may conceivably lie in the models
presented, rather than in the transactions themselves.4 The policymaker's
60. Occasionally a greenmail payment may provide an unusually powerful signal of the extent of
conversion of target assets by self-interested management. Some would explain the ousting of Disney
management after its greenmail payment to Steinberg on this basis. Yet such cases hardly justify
greenmail.
61. As part of a demonstration that any greenmail payment is desirable, Macey and McChesney
would have to show not only that a particular greenmail payment was the source of an increase in
shareholder wealth, see supra note 43, but also that the greenmail decision was based on an accurate
target management calculation of the kind they suggest.
62. See supra note 43.
63. Macey & McChesney, supra note 8, at 16-17, 37-43. See also supra text accompanying
notes 7-8.
64. One reader of an earlier draft of this paper suggested that a better model of greenmail would
account for the behavior of the greenmailer as a repeat player in a multi-period takeover game. Addi-
tional efforts to model greenmail are underway. See, e.g., I. DIWAN, J. WALDRON & K. WEIGELT,
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dilemma is that she cannot wait until completion of a fully developed
model of a controversial transaction or practice before deciding how to
respond. The attempt to construct and understand models can, however,
deepen and refine the intuitions which lie behind the decision whether
and how to intervene.
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